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## EUROPEAN ANTIMISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEM – POST SECOND PHASE IMPLEMENTATION PERSPECTIVE IN THE CONTEXT OF NATO-RUSSIA RELOCATION

**Daniel-Nicolae Bănică\***

\*"Carol I" National Defence University, Bucharest, Romania

**Abstract:** *2014 was a year when the world finally taken out of its auto-imposed self-confidence and serenity. Ukraine triggered the unavoidable confrontation between Russian Federation and both USA and EU. The European economical problems became impossible to be ignored anymore and the anti-system groups win a bigger influence power with each political election. After eight years since the invasion against Georgia, Russian Federation showed that it has a rapid action capability able to trigger an attack to reconquer the lost territories after the Russian collapse. While the Americans are installing the anti-ballistic shield in Europe, the Russians are installing their missile system in Ukraine in order to establish their own readiness system. Two antiballistic capabilities are foreseen for 2016 - American and Russian, facing each other within a range of 800 kilometer distance, which means an overreaction on both sides.*

**Keywords:** *anti-missile shield, destruction zones, shield, military cooperation, reaction capacity*

### 1. GENERAL INFORMATION

The warfare of the future will require decisive changes for the military body, whereas the emphasis will be put on the number, but the quality of the forces reaching a maximum strenght using the optimal combination of knowledge, operating rhythm, precision and lethal capability, all applied in a joint context.

Recent developments in contemporary world confirm that today's security environment goes across a period marked by complex challenges and financial difficulties.

At the moment, Romania is caught in the middle between the Russian interests and Western interests: the transatlantic relationship is vital for Romania and it does not exist

without the European Union. In this context, Romania must remain a pillar of stability in the area and a trusted partner for NATO and EU.

The representatives of the Russian Federation stated that they do not intend to limit NATO in creating a missile shield against missile threats from the Middle East, but do not want it to be done at the expense of the security of their own State. The main concern of Russia, according to the statements made, is that a relationship based on mutual trust cannot be built as long as instruments of deterrence of one party (e.g. the Russian Federation nuclear force) will be the target of NATO missile defense tools. In this regard, Chief of the General Staff Gerasimov of Russia, expressed, during a meeting within the

framework of Russia-NATO Council held in May 2012, his hope that NATO will undertake the necessary actions to remove Russia's concerns about the missile shield elements deployment and argued that Russia has offered solutions which could help restore the confidence in NATO [1].

If NATO decided to reinforce the eastern flank, in turn, at present, Russia strengthens its military capability to activate and sustain more similar conflicts to the one in Ukraine, in various European countries. According to the American Lieutenant-General Ben Hodges, Moscow's actions do not represent an immediate threat at present, but in the future the risk will be higher. Continuous improvement of the Russian army will provide the possibility of Vladimir Putin to start up to three operations simultaneously, without the need for a general mobilization of the military, declared the American Lieutenant-General Ben Hodges.

The new configuration of the Russian antiballistic missile defence is based on the automatic control system of the Air Force and Aerospace Defence, conceived by Almaz Antey Company. Interceptor anti-air missiles, as well as mobile antiballistic missile defense systems and radars will be connected to the common control center. Thereafter, all new anti-missile systems, such as S-500 missiles and new radars will be integrated into this system [2].

The automated control system shall process the the information obtained from all the terrestrial radar systems, from all the AWACS planes and from the space detection systems. Connection and exchange of information will be provided by mobile systems of wireless high-speed transmission made by Mikran Company, in Tomsk [3].

Russian expert said that for a global system of missile defense to be installed throughout the Russian territory, is required at least the production of advanced anti-air missiles. *“At present Russia have already such missiles, which exhibit, however, numerous deficiencies. There is, especially, no common radar coverage throughout the country“*, Kononov explained.

## **2. HYBRID WARFARE IN UKRAINE - INFLECTION POINT OF NATO AND RUSSIAN FEDERATION RELATIONSHIP**

The Russian Federation desideratum to control Ukraine was based on perceptions such as ethnic and historical, (the Russians consider Ukrainians as their “prodigal” brothers and the Crimean as a peninsular Russia), blooming economic policy (the need to extend the Eurasian Union), and strategic military calculations (need permanent military allies and/or buffer states). Although the fraternity feelings of Russians towards Ukrainians are logical, the urge to make Kiev a subordinate to Moscow, in military terms, is not logical [4].

Not just territory, culture, history and the Russian minority are common reasons why Russia wants to keep Ukraine within its sphere of influence. In Ukraine are at stake the economic interests of Russia. The territory of Ukraine providesthe Russian gas transit to Europe (approximately 80% of Russian gas is transported through the Ukrainean pipelines). Also, the Russian military and industrial system has significant interests in Ukraine, given the fact that a large number of spare parts and engines are imported from here.

Russian oligarchs would like to obtain, the Ukrainian economy “pearls”. Should be mentioned here and the rich croplands of the country. In addition, Ukraine has huge economic potential and is a great outlet, taking into account that its population goes far outnumbered than the population of other Member States of Commonwealth of Independent States – CIS. Ukraine also has a geostrategic importance for Russia. If Ukraine withdraws from the orbit of interest of Russia, this could mean a change of Moscow security parameters.

Vladimir Putin's dezideratum on the modernization of the Russian State to be a superpower has a sphere of influence within the post-Soviet space. A Ukrainian State, opting for an association agreement with the EU, facet supported by all leaders of significance of the opposition, will create a huge gap in the Russian President's objective.



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The revolution in Ukraine and the removal in February 2014 of former President Viktor Yanukovich was "a coup d'Etat" as Vladimir Putin estimated. The annexation, a month later, of Crimea – which was part of Ukraine only since the 1950s – was inevitable after the change in the data of Kiev problem. "For Russia, Crimea makes a civilizational and sacred sense, just as it is the Temple Mount in Jerusalem for Jews or Muslims", said the Kremlin leader [5].

After the annexation of Crimea, Russian foreign policy has been placed on previously unknown directions. At stake are not only Crimea, Ukraine or other country in Eastern Europe, but also the role and place of Russia in the international system. Russia has not only attacked Ukraine, but also the whole European system of rules and laws and European agenda itself. Moscow wants not just to restore its scope of geopolitics influence, but also to legitimize it as a basic principle of the international system [6].

The creation of a global anti-missile defense system is "a threat to everyone", that "gives the illusion of invincibility", Russian President Vladimir Putin declared in December 2, 2014, in his speech argued in front of reunited chambers of Parliament during the annually meeting on the State of the nation. According to Russian President, the most sensitive issue in terms of international security was the United States' decision "to abandon in 2002 the Treaty on ballistic missile defense". Putin added that although he does not want to engage in a new arms race, Russia will provide its defence even under "current (global) conditions". The President has also stated that Russia does not want to abandon its relations with the United States and Europe, but also trying to develop ties with Latin America and East Asia [7].

The takeover of the control over the Crimea by Russian Federation allowed Crimea to strengthen its force projection capabilities at the Black Sea by positioning antinaval missiles, air defence systems and strong naval aviation capabilities in the recently annexed peninsula. De exemplu, în plus față de avioanele de atac de tipul „Su-24”, rușii au început să disloce avioane multirol relativ avansate de tipul „Su-30” în Crimeea. For example, in addition to attack aircraft as “Su-24” type, the Russians have started to deploy relatively advanced aircraft as the multirole “Su-30” in Crimea. Moscow will also build a base in Novorossiysk, which will serve as a Center for its naval presence in the Black Sea.

In the aftermath of the past year arisen events in Ukrainian zone there are prefigured two disjoint ideological blocks:

**a.** The NATO and EU, according to which Russia annexed illegally Crimea from the standpoint of international law; Russia acts subversively to destabilize Ukraine; Russia supports separatists in Eastern Ukraine; Russia tries to maintain Ukraine under its own sphere of influence in order to stop NATO's expansion; Russia wants to maintain a buffer zone between Russian and NATO borders; Russia seeks an extension for completion a counteroffer to U.S. missile shield.

**b.** Russia, according to which Russia is not involved in Ukraine, Russia condemns the interference of the West in the Ukrainian crisis, Russia condemns military intervention as such Ukrainian authorities against separatists; Russia does not want an overt war with NATO but is bound to defend itself; Russia is trying to create its own safety umbrella as a reaction to NATO'S refusal to stop the anti-missile shield program; Russia does not want a NATO surround by its western flank.

### 3. STAGES OF IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ANTI-MISSILE SHIELD IN EUROPE

Romania has been and will remain a constant promoter – in NATO framework, of the missile-defence project, acting with consistency for its materialization. In this respect, the decisions taken at the NATO Summit in Bucharest (April 2008), reiterated at the Strasbourg-Kehl (April 2009), Lisbon (November 2010) and Chicago (May 2012) referred to the development of a comprehensive system, able to “cover the entire Ally territory, in accordance with the Alliance's security indivisibility and collective solidarity principles. Romania supported the Chicago statement regarding the Interim Capability of NATO ballistic missile defense system”. The decision of the Supreme Council of National Defence – SCND (Romania) concerning the participation of the American Missile Defense System is in full agreement with what has been established at NATO level, being recorded so far in the bilateral cooperation register [8].

According to the *Report on the review of the Ballistic Missile Defense Review Report*, published by the American Department of Defence at the 1st of February 2010, four phases of implementation were envisaged:

**Phase 1:** protect some parts of South-Eastern Europe, through the deployment of an advanced radar system (intended for detecting missiles launched from the ascending phase of their trajectory) and mounted on ships SM3-TAKES interceptors. Phase 1 started on 7 March 2011, by sending the *USS Monterey* ship in the Mediterranean Sea, equipped with Aegis system, namely making operational radar in Turkey, at Kurecik.

**Phase 2 (2015 time horizon):** expand NATO Allies protection through the implementation of a new generation of SM3-IB interceptors (able to be launched from the ground), placed in a land base, amplasați într-o bază terestră, namely at Deveselu. The system which is to be placed at Deveselu is foreseen to reach the operational capability by the fourth trimestre of 2015.

**Phase 3 (2018 time horizon):** system extension to cover all NATO Member States in Europe, through the introduction into service of a new version of SM3 interceptor, which is to be set in a land base, in Northern Europe (Redzikowo, Poland).

**Phase 4 (2020 time horizon) – According to the timetable made in 2010 by the U.S. Department of Defence** the phase entailed: the extension of protection to any possible intercontinental missile attacks, including through the further development of SM3 missiles and radar systems, and by placing in Poland a new class of interceptors [9].

Studies made at the beginning of the second decade of the 21st century, indicated that the Southeast Europe would be increasingly vulnerable to threats with short and medium range missiles. It was appreciated that attaining as quickly as possible the operational readiness of the missile defense system could strengthen national security both directly through the covering protection provided for the entire national territory, and indirectly, because of the the significant and deterrent role of the system, able to reduce the risks associated with possible missile attacks. The role of deterrence will remove the risk of attack against any other Allied territory.

The destruction area of a ballistic missile shield of a defense system is defined in the first place by the interceptor parameters, namely by the maximum speed achieved when the last Rocket Motor separates from the previous stage on the condition that the elements of detection, tracking, and command and control could ensure the interceptor use to its maximum capabilities.

Considering that at the end of running of all the three-stage rocket motor of the SM3 interceptor (the first rocket motor – MK72, the second rocket motor - MK 104 Dual Thrust Rocket Motor, and the third stage rocket motor – MK 136), the interceptor is at about 100 km height and that from moment it follows a ballistic trajectory to the area, where the target becomes detectable by the strike vehicle's sensor capabilities, then the impact area could be considered acceptable as being a hemisphere with the center placed at the launching point of the interceptor and with a



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radius equal to the maximum height reached by the interceptor.

By some not very complicated mathematical relationships, ranging from Kepler's laws, you can get the value of the maximum flight height. This is a function of (It depends on the) speed (at the end of the acceleration portion) and (on) the angle of the vector with the horizontal speed at that point. Considering that it is desirable for ballistic rocket interception to be made at a higher possible height, allowing for a possible re-engagement with endoatmospheric systems, it can be concluded that the angle of the vector with the horizontal velocity at the end of the acceleration portion should be greater than  $60^\circ$ . With regard to the upper limit of this angle, it can be considered a highest conditioning speed at its peak speed of the impact vehicle. Thus, in order to ensure the destruction of ballistic rocket by direct strike, the impact vehicle should have at the meeting point a minimum of 1 km/s speed. For the SM3 block I type interceptor, which reaches a maximum speed at the end of the acceleration portion of 3 km/s, the maximum angle ensuring its peak speed of more than 1 km/s is  $69^\circ$ . Between these two angular values, the height at its peak varies between 490 km and 580 km, so it can be concluded that the average destruction area for a SM3 block I interceptor is a hemisphere with a radius of about 535 km.

Under the same conditions of calculation regarding the SM3 block IIA type interceptor (that, more than likely will not be installed in Roania, according to President Obama statement) which is expected to reach a speed at the end of the acceleration of about 5 km/s, it can be concluded that the optimal destruction would be a hemisphere with a radius of about 1535 km.

According to these estimates, the areas of destruction for a launch from the Deveselu of a SM3 block IB interceptor, namely a block IIA, would look like in figure 1 [10].



Fig. 1 Deveselu maximum launching range for the two kind of interceptors: the SM3 block I and block II

#### 4. PERSPECTIVES AND POSSIBLE SCENARIOS OF DEVELOPMENT OF THE MISSILE DEFENSE

Of the lessons identified and lessons learned so far, and in pursuit of the scenarios on which the events developed, it is clear that, in relation to the with NATO, Russia has an advantage in terms of life cycle of planning and decision-making, as well as the ability to deploy rapidly and concentrate forces and means of to achieve superiority in the event of conflict escalation.

After the war ended in Georgia, Russia has carefully analyzed the lessons learned and proceed to modernise step by step, its military system: it started by launching of structural reforms in the field of defence, in 2009 has developed a new National Security Strategy; in 2010 a new Military Doctrine has been elaborated, and in 2012 the Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation has been issued.

At the same time, Russia has adapted its 2009 doctrine and is able to plan, organize, execute, and manage assignments specific to hybrid conflict under the circumstances the new doctrine has a horizon of applicability up to 2020.

Ukraine's decision made on 23 December 2014, to renounce to its status of unaligned country to approach NATO, in the aftermath of the annexation of the Crimean Peninsula by Russia and in progress conflict with prorussians rebels in the East of the country, change although not radically the policy and the approach of the Russian Federation regarding the conflict. As a result, in December 26, 2014, President Vladimir Putin has referred to the defensive character of the Russian military doctrine, which will be maintained, and focused on a military engagement of Russia only if all non-violent solutions will be used up. "The probability of a large-scale warfare against Russia fell down", but in some areas there are a number of intensified threats, such as territorial claims, "interference in the internal affairs" of other countries and sending strategic weapons in space.

The revised military doctrine of the Russian Federation was published on 26 December 2014 and points to the changes in terms of the threats and global security affairs perception starting with 2010, taking into account the lessons identified and lessons learned by the Russian Federation from recent crises and presents a foresight of the threat environment addressed to Russian Federation and its defence. The revised military doctrine reaffirms the the Russian Federation peremptory policy to defend its strategic interests, as the revision of the doctrine being triggered by the change in security environment, and, as a consequence the modernization of the armed forces, and the development of Moscow political and military leadership thinking.

In November 2014, the Russian Defence Minister has obtained a fifth missile complex type "Iskander-M" brigade-level effective, generating the speculation that it could be transported in Crimea. In any circumstance, the General Staff of the Russian Air Force has

not excluded the deployment of type "Iskander-M" missile complex in Peninsula before the year 2016. Accordingly, the members of the Armed Services Committee of the U.S. Senate have expressed their concern that the deployment of "Iskander" system in Crimea violates the Treaty on intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF), also represents a threat to Europe. System designers claim that the "Iskander" system can be stocked with up to ten different types of warheads. This makes the system an optimal one for destroying rocket systems, long-range artillery systems, air defense and missile defense systems, and C4 ISR infrastructure as well (command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance). Brigade-level complex includes 51 vehicles of which: 12 grenade launchers, 12 transport-loading systems, 11 command and control systems, 14 support vehicles, one maintenance vehicle and one preparation of information vehicle, a number of complex high-precision guided missiles, and armoured vehicles and training facilities.

To prove the superiority of nuclear forces and strategic transactions, coincidentally with the release of the new military doctrine of the Russian Federation, on 26 December 2014, 11.02, Moscow time (10.02, Romania's time) the Russians have made a test with the intercontinental ballistic rocket RS-24 Yars, with solid fuel and detachable warhead, on a terrestrial base of Plesetsk Space complex, in order to reaffirm President Putin's statement regarding the fact that the new doctrine remains defensive, but Russia has at its disposal powerful tools, including credible deterrent capabilities [11]. The warheads used in test program "were programmed to strike targets at the Kura range, Kamchatka Peninsula". The RS-24 Yars missile was introduced into service in July 2010 and it is an improved version of Topol-M ballistic missile. The ballistic missile is able to carry multiple nuclear warheads that can reach independent targets and has the ability to avoid the anti-missile defence systems within a radius of up to 12,000 kilometers.

It is possible that future actions of the Russian Federation to be sequences array and



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be carried out in three phases. During the first phase, Russia will be concerned about the recovery of influence and effective control of the former Soviet Union, re-establishing the buffer zone that Soviet Union offered. During the second phase, Russia will aim to create a second level of buffer areas beyond the borders of the former Soviet Union. Russia will try to do the herein above mentioned without creating a solid wall of opposition, as the one which undermined it during the Cold War. In the third phase, a process that takes place from the very beginning, the Russian Federation will try to prevent the formation of coalitions against itself [12].

**Possible scenarios:**

**A. Military**

***I. Maintaining of relatively cold war in Ukraine.*** Hypothesis: the Russian Federation will continue to sustain the separatists' actions, while escalating the arms race and redployments of technique and troops in sensitive areas. Implications: maintaining tension in the area, concomitant with arms race escalation. Viability of anti-missile shield consequences: the completion of the IV-th quarter 2015 phase related to missile shield elements in Deveselu will be achieved under normal circumstances, screened by the implementation of NATO Readiness Action Plan – RAP.

***II. The conflict escalation and conquest by Russian Federation of Ukrainean territories, with the intention of reaching even to the mouths of the Danube.***

Hypothesis: in the first phase, the Russian Federation could pursue to capture Mariupol port at Azov Sea, or even to develop a land bridge to Crimea along the Western coast of the sea, and then to extend this corridor up to the mouths of the Danube. Implications: It requires that Russian Federation deploy

significant forces and assume a large number of casualties, approach that would likely be lacking of domestical popularity. Renewed military actions would lead to tougher sanctions from the West side. They would further undermine the deteriorating economy of the Russian Federation, and for now, on the peak of the economic crisis, they could lead to the impossibility to support such campaign, which President Vladimir Putin knows very well. Consequences of anti-missile shield f viability: the situation would gain new connotations because the border between the Russian Federation and Deveselu elements will remain just an area of roughly 500-800 km. The Russian fleet will control even better the actions within the contiguous zone and Romanian territorial waters, accompanied by a tighter supervision of the actions of the American and Turkish vessels in this area. There will be a possibility that Russian antibalistic defense systems to relocate right on the border with Romania, and the Russian early warning systems will be able to inform almost in real time on a possible launch of a missile from Deveselu being able to fight against it in the first phase, destroying it above Romanian territory or at its border.

**B. Economic**

The fact that many States depend on natural reserves of Russia, especially on Russian gas, ensure Russia with a series of actions targeting a transboundary economic domination.

The main objectives of the Russian strategy on the Middle East are not necessarily the development of more favourable bilateral relations with individual countries as Iran, Egypt or Syria, but rather to diverge US focus from other areas important for Russians, as Ukraine. The crises in the East and recent aggressiveness of Russia have made of energy

security an essential theme to the European Union. Romania is aware that only a real European solidarity can ensure a reduction in the dependence on Russia [13]. If other European countries will not “cheat” and accept preferential agreements with Russia, then the South Streamva case rests at the level of intent/project.

### **C. Political and diplomatical**

Russian Federation knows that it dominated half of Europe once and that the former communist bloc of states, as well as those with Slavic ancestry should not fully exit from its sphere of influence.

Moscow is turning more and more towards the Western Balkans, because it does not want doesn't want this region to become part of the West. And even in the larger States that are EU members, such as Bulgaria, Moscow continues to try to exert its influence through the energy sector.

For a long time, the Russian Federation has focused its attention on Belgrade which has had always strong relations with Moscow. During 2014, the Serbian President, Tomislav Nikolić, has developed a close relationship with Vladimir Putin, trying to position the Republic of Serbia closer to EU. In 2013, during a visit to the summer residence of Vladimir Putin in Sochi, Tomislav Nikolić has signed a Declaration on strategic partnership between Belgrade and Moscow. At the end of 2013, Serbia signed an agreement on military cooperation with Russia, and in October 2014, to Berlin's displeasure, Serbia received the visit of Vladimir Putin, context in which Tomislav Nikolić offered him the highest badge of honor of the State. These are just a few steps taken at the public level [14].

The Hungarian, Czech and Slovakian Governments positions in relation with Kremlin differs in terms of the degree of energy dependency and trade relations with Russia

Budapest depends on NATO regarding the security, on EU in terms of investment and financing, and on the Russian Federation in the field of energy. Accordingly, Hungary promotes a multilateral strategy for its foreign policy, maintaining the relations with the EU and NATO as a member of both organizations,

and at the same time, aiming to establish stronger economic and political relationships with Russia.

Geographically, the Czech Republic is more remoted from Russian Federation and less dependent on the economic side than Hungary, which allows a greater space of maneuvering in terms of policy approach on Moscow. However, the Prague authorities make a special effort to balance the foreign relationships and maintain the political and commercial relations with Russia. The Czech Government has promoted a joint policy toward Russia.

Slovakia makes significant efforts to maintain close political and trade relations with all the neighbouring States and regional powers. Slovakia is to a large extent integrated into the European market and is the only member of the Visegrad Group, which is part of the Euro area. The Slovak leadership strives to maintain those relationships in business and to avoid any disruption of trade with Russia. Undoubtedly, as the primary transit country for Russian energy resources flow to European markets, Slovakia holds a certain level of influence in its relations with Russia [15].

## **5. CONCLUSIONS & ACKNOWLEDGMENT**

The antiballistic missile brings together under one umbrella very different technologies, all having a common one characteristic: they are the most advanced technologies at this time.

The question that arises is the following: Is missile shield impenetrable?

Given the fact that throughout the history of military technics and technologies it has been a race between weapons and antiarms we can be sure that the antiballistic missile shield has its own antidote.

In this context, the antiballistic missile shield can be countered through a series of actions, of which I recall the following:

a. The easiest but most expensive solution: launching towards the opponent a much larger number of missiles than he could ever intercept.

b. A cheaper and accessible solution: increase in number of false targets, so that a





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good part of the counterattack could be lost on the air.

c. Other way of missile shield penetration: total elimination of one of its components. For example, the annihilation of satellites that guide and transmit continuously data to opponent's missile shield before launching their own attack.

d. The smartest solution for the anti-missile shield penetration: producing hipersonic vehicles/interceptors highly manoeuvrable able to penetrate with relative ease any anti-missile shield existing at this time.

NATO insists on implementing two separate missile defense systems, but coordinated, one Russian and one of the Alliance. On the other side, Moscow proposes the creation of an indivisible system integrating the devices of the two parts.

Russia has taken a series of actions described as countermeasures to NATO Defense ballistics program. Some of these measures are proactive, such as launching new research programs and strategic development programs. For example, the Russian Government is developing new ballistic missiles, of which tactical and technical characteristics are adapted to the new technologies and can circumvent in most effective way the missile defense systems.

As a corollary, a few conclusions are outlined in the following:

a. at the 25th anniversary of the fall of the Communist bloc, after the uprisings in the autumn and winter of 1989, the world had entered a new stage, likely a reiterative one conditioned by the recalibration of the power balance;

b. war without limits, non-linear war or hybrid war as conducted in Ukraine is only the peak of the iceberg of what the world calls the start of World War III;

c. the collapse, on July 19, in Eastern Ukraine of the MH17 flight belonging to Malaysia Airlines, which had left Amsterdam and was heading to Kuala Lumpur, carrying 208 people of whom 189 were Dutch nationals, was not due to the interception of the aircraft by an anti-aircraft missile launched from a BUK anti-aircraft defense system, but represented an intempestive threat because the pilot had changed the flight path, hadn't responded to radio calls, was heading towards an island where it was assumed that there were "extremely delicate" elements, and in this context it was shot down by the ones who "had to do it, and were feeling threatened";

d. attacks in Paris on 8 January 2015, followed by other attempts in Germany and Belgium a week later, are part of a default scenario, which will lead to an exacerbation of nationalism and a conviction in unison of Islam. In this way, arms race and international security restructure could be justified; there is now a given pretext for future interventions in the Middle East but also in any other parts of the globe;

e. by the annexation of Crimea, Russia took a step forward and opened a possible, new arms race; the elements of the American Ballistic Missile Shield placed in Poland, Romania and Turkey, as well as at the Black Sea could be countered, in the case of missile launching within the missile acceleration area, i.e. much easier, by Russian elements of missile shield located in Crimea and mounted on Russian ships, which are increasingly more numerous at the Black Sea and in the frozen North, which also is dominated by Russia.

f. during the next 10 or 15 years we are going to witness a massive force relocation, rapid deployment and re-deployment of forces, scenarios and defined local and regional challenges, realignment of alliances and new

types of ordnance experiments, all made by the great military and economic powers, at the expense of peoples and populations; the recent changes in the climate, the record of 2014 as the warmest year in the history of climatic measurements, the multitude of surface earthquakes in Vrancea area, which not characteristic for that zone, the crowd of meteors entering the Earth's atmosphere, and many other aspects show that psychotronic and geoclimatic war know an incessant progress.

g. starting with 2015, NATO must be capable to act quickly and to show that, if the Russian Federation is going to attack an allied country of the eastern flank, the capability required for a prompt, efficient and viable intervention is available.

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